Abstract. In pedagogical formal systems one needs to systematically give examples of hypotheses made. This main characteristic is not the only one needed, and a formal definition of pedagogical sub-systems of the Calculus of Constructions (CC) has already been stated. Here we give such a pedagogical sub-system of CC corresponding to the second-order pedagogical λ-calculus of Colson and Michel. It thus illustrates the appropriateness of the formal definition, and opens the study to stronger systems of the λ-cube, for which CC is the most expressive representative. In addition we study the type-checking problem for the formalisms of those pedagogical calculi of second-order.
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Introduction
The Poincaré criterion The main feature of pedagogical formal systems is to always require the user to give examples of used hypotheses. This need for systematic exemplification has lead to the terminology of pedagogical formal systems, because it is the formal counterpart of the usual informal teaching practice consisting of giving examples of newly introduced notions. The necessity of such a constraint was already observed by Poincaré [34] in the case of definitions by postulates: "A definition by postulate has value only when the existence of the object defined has been proved [...] by means of examples [...] .". Since every set of hypotheses made on some objects (e.g. propositions or λ-terms) can be seen as a set of definitions by postulates, in the following when for a formal system every set of used hypotheses can be exemplified we will say it meets the Poincaré criterion.
Formal pedagogy More formally, for instance in propositional natural deduction systems -studied by Colson and Michel up to the propositional second-order calculus in [4, 5] -whenever one wants to use the set of formulas ∆ as hypotheses she must give a substitution σ (the examples) from propositional variables to formulas such that ⊢σ(A) for each A ∈ ∆. Through the propositions-as-types correspondence [21] this requirement extends to type systems -second-order λ-calculus studied by Colson and Michel in [6] : a typing environment x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n can be exemplified if there are terms t i and a substitution σ from type variables to types such that ⊢t i : σ(A i ).
From a logical point of view and in an intuitionist framework, this pedagogical constraint does not allow the use of negation and reasoning by contradiction: it is no more possible to assume a formula A that will reveal to be a contradiction since no instance of this formula can be proved. It then agrees with the negationless mathematics advocated by Griss as a refinement of intuitionism [16, 17, 18, 19] .
From a computational point of view, it means that for every type at least one of its instances has to be inhabited by a term. This last property leads to the notion of usefulness of λ-terms in pedagogical type systems: every function f of type A → B can be applied to a term u of type A when A is closed.
Overview of the article In this article, we will focus on the extension of these results to the type systems of the Barendregt's λ-cube [1] . Indeed those systems have logical and computational meaning, and the most powerful is the Calculus of Constructions (CC) of Coquand [7] for which a formal study of pedagogy has already been investigated by Colson and Demange in [3] . First the formalism of CC being more explicit, the Poincaré criterion become: if an environment x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n is well-formed 1 then there are terms t i such that ⊢t i : A i [x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ← t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ] where [· ← · ] is the usual substitution from variables to terms. The conclusion of the investigation was a complete formal definition of a pedagogical subsystem of CC (see def. 10): the formal system has to (i) be a subsystem of CC; (ii) verify subject reduction; (iii) meet the Poincaré criterion; (iv) and meet the converse of the Poincaré criterion. The converse of the Poincaré criterion is needed to ensure expressiveness: in [3] a system CC r satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) but not (iv) has been exhibited with a good computational power but strong logical limitations. Also in [5] a weakly pedagogical second-order calculus P s -Prop 2 has been stated for which a type system can be obtained satisfying (i), (iii) and (iv) but not (ii).
At the end of the study about pedagogical CC, it was suggested that it is possible to build a pedagogical subsystem of CC in the precise sense of the previous definition, corresponding to the pedagogical second-order λ-calculus P-Prop 2 of [6] . This construction is the main subject of this present paper, the difficulties were mainly due to a difference in formalism, the one of P-Prop 2 -and of Girard's System F [13] -being more liberal than the one of CC, and the need to stick to the definition. Especially the (i) of the previous definition does not allow the addition of constant symbols (initial examples) to the calculus, which was the case in P-Prop 2 .
Outline of the article In section 2 we recall the usual notations, definitions and well-known results about the calculus of constructions (CC) and its subsystem of second order λ 2 . In sections 3, 4, 5 we define and study pedagogical subsystems of CC of second order: first with explicit and total examples (also called motivations) λ 2 e , then with total motivations λ 2 t and finally with partial motivations λ 2 p . Each is obtained from the previous by relaxing some constraints, the last one fully satisfying the definition of pedagogical subsystem of CC. Then in section 6 we link those systems with the previously stated pedagogical second order λ-calculus P-Prop 2 of [6] . We end in section 7 by showing the undecidabilty of type checking for all those type systems. Finally we conclude in section 8 by suggesting a formalism to recover type checking in pedagogical formal systems, and open the study toward more expressive systems of the λ-cube based on the current work.
Related works Obviously the works on pedagogical formal systems previously mentioned are relevant: the minimal propositional calculus over →, ∧ and ∨ has been studied in [4] ; the second order propositional calculus in [5] ; the second-order λ-calculus in [6] ; and an investigation on the whole Calculus of Constructions in [3] . A great overview of those works can be found in the introduction of [3] , to which we can add the following unmentioned and unpublished 2 result of Michel in [28] : every λ-term of the second-order λ-calculus admit a continuation passing style translation that can be typed in the pedagogical second-order λ-calculus, ensuring the preservation of programs.
Also in an intuitionistic framework, which is the case here, pedagogical mathematics are linked with the negationless mathematics philosophy. The idea of negationless mathematics appeared in the middle of the last century when Griss expressed it as a step further of the intuitionistic philosophy of Brouwer. Indeed, in intuitionistic mathematics, a proof of a negative statement ¬A impose to assume A in order to obtain a contradiction. But assuming A is no intuitive method for Griss since it will reveal to be an impossible construction. First works of Griss [16, 17, 18, 19] constitute an informal outline of a geometry, an arithmetic, a set theory and an analysis without negation. Heyting [20] and Franchella [10] summarize differences of viewpoint about intuitionism of Brouwer and that of Griss. Some formal developments of the Griss desiderata has been proposed, from which we can cite those of Vredenduin [38] , Gilmore [12] , Valpola [37] , Nelson [32, 31] , Minichiello [29] , López-Escobar [24, 25] , Mezhlumbekova [27] and more recently of Krivtsov [22, 23] , dealing with negationless predicate logic and arithmetic in natural deduction systems or in sequent calculus. One of the main ideas is the introduction of a quantified implication A( x) → x B( x) which is interpreted in intuitionistic logic by ∀ x A( x) → B( x) ∧ ∃ xA( x). Mints [30] provides a good overview of those works.
Background and Notations
In this section, we briefly recall usual notations, definitions and results about the Calculus of Constructions (CC) and its subsystem of second-order λ 2 . At the end we recall the formal definition of pedagogical sub-system of the Calculus of Constructions resulting of the study in [3] .
Definitions and notations
We try to use x, y, . . . as symbols for variables, u, v, w, t, . . . to denote terms, A, B, . . . for types or formulas, Γ, Γ ′ , . . . for environments. The set of raw terms of CC is defined by induction: the variables x, and constants Prop and Type are raw terms; λx A .u, ∀x A .B and u v are raw terms if x is a variable and u, v, A, B are raw terms. S(u) is the set of sub-terms of u, containing u. For brevity, in the following terms will refer to raw terms. ≡ is the syntactical equality of terms modulo renaming of bound variables 3 . We note by β the usual beta-reduction relation between terms; * β its reflexive and transitive closure; and = β its equivalence closure. A term u is in normal form if it is not reducible, i.e. there is no term t such that u β t. If all possible reductions from a term u lead to a normal form, then the term u is said to be strongly normalizing.
V(t) is the set of free variables of t. If V(t) = ∅ then t is said to be closed. The usual capture avoiding substitution of u for x in t is noted t[x ← u ]; and t[x 1 , . . . , x n ← u 1 , . . . , u n ] is the simultaneous substitution of u 1 for x 1 , u 2 for x 2 , etc. in t. When dealing with substitutions as mathematical objects, we will use list symbolism: [ ] is the empty substitution, and if σ is a substitution then σ::(x → a) is a new substitution mapping all variables y = x to σ(y) and x to a. The application of a substitution is extended from variables to terms in the usual way:
To shorten notations, we might use a vector symbolism: t denotes a sequence of terms t 1 , . . . , t n ; and ∀ x A .B denotes ∀x An environment is a finite list of associations variable-term. The empty environment is noted [ ] or omitted, otherwise it is of the form x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , or Γ, Γ ′ where Γ and Γ ′ are environments. The domain of an environment is the finite set of its variables: dom(x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Substitutions can be applied to environments: (
Similarly for substitutions σ ′ σ. We will also write Γ ≤i or Γ <i for the first i-th (resp. i − 1-th) elements of Γ, similarly with σ ≤i or σ <i .
In CC there are two kinds of judgements: Γ wf c means that the environment Γ is syntactically well-formed, and Γ ⊢ c t : A expresses that the term t is of type A in the environment Γ.
Implicitly, Γ ⊢ c A : κ signifies that there is κ ∈ {Prop, Type} such that this previous statement holds. Γ ⊢ c A 1 : A 2 : . . . : A n is the contraction of Γ ⊢ c A 1 : A 2 , etc. and Γ ⊢ c A n−1 : A n . If the contraction appears as a premise of a rule it denotes n − 1 premises, and as a conclusion of a rule it expands to n − 1 possible conclusions (i.e. n − 1 rules).
Rules of CC are presented in fig. 1 : close presentations can be found in [8] , with well formed judgements; in [2] avoiding weakening rule; or [1] presenting usual properties of CC. Removing some rules of CC we obtain λ 2 of fig. 2 , a subsystem corresponding to the polymorphic λ-calculus also known as the system F of Girard-Reynolds [14, 35] . Notice that the raw-terms stay the same.
As usual a derivation of a judgement is a finite tree rooted by the judgement and where leafs are instances of inference rules without premise. A sub-derivation is then a sub-tree, and a strict sub-derivation is a sub-tree which is not the whole tree.
Property 7
(i) If Γ ⊢ 2 C : Type then C ≡ Prop and the last used rule is (ax);
(ii) If Γ ⊢ 2 C : Prop then the last used rule is (var) or (prod).
Proof by case analysis on the last used rule.
(i) (var) Impossible case because Type can not be in the environment (prop. 2).
(app) There are two cases:
• B ≡ x and v ≡ Type: which is impossible (prop. 2);
• B ≡ Type: hence Γ ⊢ 2 ∀x A . Type : κ (prop. 6), which is impossible (prop. 2).
(ii) (app) We have Γ ⊢ 2 ∀x A .B : κ (prop. 6) which has to be obtained by the (prod) rule, hence Γ, x : A ⊢ 2 B : Prop. From B[x ← v ] ≡ Prop we have two cases:
• B ≡ x and v ≡ Prop: the second premise is then Γ ⊢ 2 Prop : A obtained by the (ax) rule, hence A ≡ Type which is impossible (prop. 2);
Prop which is impossible.
Proof by structural induction on the derivation: we only need to consider the rules (var) and (prod) (prop. 7).
Usually the current state of a proof is indicated by a sequent Γ ⊢t : A meaning that "t is a proof of A under the assumptions Γ". In the pedagogical practice we also need examples of the hypotheses of Γ which we can make explicit using enhanced sequents of the form Γ ⊢ σ t : A meaning "t is a proof of A under the assumptions Γ exemplified by σ" where σ is a substitution from the variables of Γ to terms. In the same way we switch from judgements Γ wf to Γ wf σ . Each assumption/variable of Γ has to be examplified by σ, hence the total and explicit motivations system λ 2 e of fig. 3 . Making the examples/motivations explicit have at least two benefits. First it allows to better reflect the practice of pedagogical mathematics by using a global example during a proof. Second it simplifies and specifies the statements about the formalism: we can act on the motivations and then appreciate the constraints they impose or they are subject to.
System definition
We extend the raw terms with the two constants o and ⊤. Inference rules of λ 2 e are presented on fig. 3 . The (prod) rule of λ 2 is constrained as (e-prod) in λ 2 e in order to avoid empty types as soon as possible (e.g. ∀A Prop .A). Indeed those empty types can not be examplified, and allowing to manipulate them could break the subject reduction property (see [5] ) or the Poincaré criterion if we introduce them into environments. The added constraint then requires that the formed type to be compatible with the current motivation σ, namely that the instance σ(∀x A .B) be inhabited. Also the additional (second) premise of the rule (e-env 2 ) should not be considered as a constraint: the term a is already contained in the derivation of the first premise (see lem. 17). This last fact is important for explicit motivations systems: if Γ ⊢ 2e σ A : κ does not permit us to build an example a of σ(A) then it means the motivabilty, and consequently the usability, of the type A has not been tested soon enough.
Remark 11
Substitutions and environments related by wf 2e or ⊢ 2e match: they have the same size, and to each variable of the environment correspond a raw term at the same position in the substitution (see lem. 13).
The constants o and ⊤, the initial examples, are mandatory to begin derivations: otherwise one would only be allowed to derive [ ] wf In this section we show that λ 2 e almost satisfies the required properties of a pedagogical subsystem of CC: indeed in λ 2 e judgements and raw-terms are modified with respect to those of λ 2 and then CC.
Preliminary results
The properties 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 are still valid for λ 2 e , modulo the addition of the corresponding explicit motivations.
Proof immediate by structural induction on the derivation: it is enough to "forget" explicit motivations and to interpret in λ 2 the constants o and ⊤ of λ 
A .u, then there are B and a such that Γ, x : A ⊢ Proof by case analysis on the last used rule, similar to the proof for λ 2 (prop. 7): to show that a derivation is impossible for λ 2 e , it is enough to notice that λ 2 e is a subsystem of λ 2 (thm. 12) and that the corresponding derivation is already impossible in λ 2 . Proof by structural induction on the derivation of x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n wf 2e σ : 
Results concerning pedagogy
Proof by structural induction on the derivation. The only rules to consider are (e-ax), (e-prod) and (e-var) (lem. 15), and only the (e-var) case is non-trivial: 
Lemma 18 (weakening)
Proof by structural induction on the derivation:
From one premise we have that Γ ⊢ (e-prod) Just as for the (e-abs) rule to be able to apply induction hypothesis.
(e-env2) [ ] a : (z → w)::σ(A) since w is closed and z ∈ dom(σ) (lem. 13), then by (e-env 2 ) we get the result.
(ii) The case where D ≡ z can be processed in the following way:
σ is a strict sub-derivation (prop. 3), then by induction hypothesis z : C, Γ wf 2e (z → w)::σ and using the (e-var) rule z : C, Γ ⊢ 2e (z → w)::σ z : C. Also C ≡ κ ′ by type uniqueness (prop. 5) since:
σ w : C by weakening (lem. 18). Let us now deal with the cases where D ≡ z, we only need to consider the rules (e-ax), (e-var) and (e-prod) (lem. 15):
By induction hypothesis z : C, Γ wf 2e (z → w)::σ and then using the (e-ax) rule we have
The induction hypothesis gives z :
′ then the (e-var) rule finishes the proof.
(e-prod)
Prop, moreover the second premise can be rewritten to ⊢ 
. . , t n−1 ] : κ n (with the x i pairwise distinct), then
Proof by induction on n:
: κ n since the x i are pairwise distinct and the t i are closed (lem. 13). We can then generalize over
Proceeding the same, we generalize over the variables from x n−2 to x 1 to finally obtain
. . , t n−1 ] then by (e-env 2 ) we finally get the result.
Lemma 21
Proof by structural induction on the derivation: 
Hence applying the (e-app) rule on those we have
and the (e-prod) rule allows us to conclude.
Proof by induction on the size of the environment: Let Γ := x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n and σ := (
after n substitutions of the motivations (lem. 21). And since the t i are closed and the x i are pairwise distinct (lem. 13) then w[
Proof immediate by structural induction on the derivation.
Lemma 24 (strengthening)
Proof by structural induction on the derivation, similar to [26, lem. 3.2.9] . The only non-immediate case is the following one:
We have z ∈ V(Γ ′ , A, u), therefore also z ∈ V(B) (lem. 23). We can then apply the induction hypothesis to get Γ, Γ ′ , x : A ⊢ 2e σ::σ ′ ::(x → a) u : B : Prop and by (e-abs) the result.
Proof By (e-abs) on the hypotheses we have Γ ⊢ Proof Let Γ ≡ x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n and σ ≡ (x 1 → a 1 ):: . . . ::(x n → a n ). By the Poincaré criterion (thm. 16) we have the derivations
and since for all i x 1 :
The result then follows by applying the converse of the Poincaré criterion (thm. 20) on:
Prop and there are terms (f i ) 1≤i≤n and (g i ) 1≤i≤n such that for all i
Proof by induction on the raw term E (generalize [6, lem. 14]): Let us first notice that if E ≡ z i , then w ′ := f i w suits. Now let us deal with the cases when E is different from all the z i . We proceed by case analysis on the last used rule producing Γ ⊢ 2e σ E[z 1 , . . . , z n ← C 1 , . . . , C n ] : Prop, which limits the analysis to three rules (lem. 15):
(e-ax) In this case E ≡ ⊤ and then w ′ := w suits.
(e-var) In this case E ≡ y is a variable different from the z i and then w ′ := w suits.
, we distinguish two cases depending on κ:
Type, which is not allowed by type uniqueness (prop. 5). Necessarily A ≡ z i for all i and then A ≡ Prop. The rule can then be rewritten in the following simpler way:
Weakening (lem. 18) with Γ, x : Prop wf 
From the first premise, we get ⊢ 
we can then apply the induction hypothesis on A to build a term a
Therefore by (e-var) we have Γ,
Prop (prop. 4, lem. 14, 15). Hence the induction hypothesis gives a term u such that Γ,
By weakening (lem. 18) on the hypothesis and using the (e-app) rule we get Γ, x : ). Now we can apply the induction hypothesis on the premises followed by an application of the (e-abs) rule to obtain the result. Since the σ(y i ) and the σ ′ (y i ) are all closed (lem. 13), we then have terms f i and g i such that ⊢ 
. We are then allowed to conclude using the (e-prod) rule. Proof by structural induction on the first derivation:
(e-env2) immediate by the induction hypothesis on the first premise followed by (eenv 2 ) and lem. 17. Induction hypothesis on the premises gives two substitutions ρ ′ and ρ ′′ such that
And we can exchange the motivation of the second one (lem. 29 and prop. 3) to obtain
Finally we get the result by applying the rule (e-abs) with ρ := ρ ′ .
(e-app) As previously, since the induction hypothesis applied to the two premises gives two substitutions ρ ′ and ρ ′′ potentially different, we chose one (lem. 29) and deduce the result by the rule (e-app). Proof by structural induction on the derivation followed by case analysis on the definition of β , similar to the one of [7, prop. 7] or [1, thm. 5.
2.15]:
(e-abs)
A being in normal form (prop. 9), only the case u β u ′ can happen: it is trivially solved using the induction hypothesis on the first premise.
There are three cases:
• u β u ′ : trivial using the induction hypothesis on the first premise and (e-app).
• v β v ′ : there are three more cases (prop. 6):
• A ≡ Type: impossible (prop. 6, 2); 
, and it is enough to apply the induction hypothesis on the second premise followed by (e-app).
• u ≡ λx C .w and u v β w[x ← v ]: generation (lem. 14) gives Γ, x : A ⊢ 2e σ w : B and by substitution (lem. 30) we have the result. Proof by structural induction on the derivation (similar to prop. 6): for the (e-abs) rule, the previous lemma 25 immediately gives us the result. ., x n : A n wf c and
e is a sub-system of λ 2 (thm. 12), itself a sub-system of CC.
(ii) It is exactly the statement of the theorem 31.
(iii) ⇒ It is exactly the statement of the theorem 16. fig. 4 ) and allow for different motivations to be used during sub-proofs. We then make the motivations implicit but still require them to completely exemplifies environments when needed. Leaving enhanced judgements leads us a step closer to a real pedagogical subsystem of CC (additional constants are maintained).
Total motivations

System definition
The following definitions of motivations of an environment or a type depend on the formal system λ 2 t (fig. 4) . To solve the apparent circularity, we can break those definitions in two parts: first a convenient abbreviation needed for the definition of the system; and second an effective definition once the inference rules of the system have been stated.
Definition 34 (Motivation of an environment)
A substitution σ motivates an environment Γ ≡ x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , abbreviated σ mot Γ, if for all i ⊢ 2t σ(x i ) : σ(A i ).
Definition 35 (Motivation of a type)
A substitution σ motivate a type C relatively to an environment Γ, abbreviated σ mot Γ C if (i) σ mot Γ and (ii) there is a term t such that ⊢ 2t t : σ(C).
Depending on the context, σ mot Γ will denote the derivations ⊢ 2t σ(x i ) : σ(A i ), or the fact that the environment Γ can be motivated by σ. The same applies for the σ mot Γ C notation too. 
Results
The properties 1, 3, 4 are still valid for λ (ii) If Γ ⊢ 2t C : Prop then the last rule of the derivation is (t-ax), (t-var) or (t-prod).
Lemma 38 (λ 2
e is a sub-system of λ 2 t ) For every substitution σ:
Proof by structural induction on the derivation. Every cases but (e-prod) are immediate: since we forget the explicit motivation, the rules are the same (or more constrained in the case of e-env 2 ) in λ Proof by structural induction on the derivation:
By induction hypothesis we have a substitution σ ′ such that Γ ⊢ 2e σ ′ A : κ, and then (lem. 17) there is a term a such that
Hence by (e-env 2 ) we obtain the result with σ := σ ′ ::(x → a).
(t-abs)
By induction hypothesis we have Γ, x : A ⊢ (iii) x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n wf 2t if and only if x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n wf c and there are terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that
t is a sub-system of λ 2 (thm. 36) itself a sub-system of CC.
(ii) From Γ ⊢ 2t t : C we have a substitution σ such that Γ ⊢ 2e σ t : C (lem. 39) and since and λ 2 t only one occurrence need to be inhabited, but it has lead us to use motivations dealing with all the possible variables of the type to be motivated, namely all the variables of the environments, making the motivations total. In order to recover this behaviour of CC r and remove the need for additional constants, we can make the motivations partial, that is allowing them to act on some variables of the environments.
System definition
As for λ 2 t the following definitions of partial motivation of an environment or a type refer to the formal system λ 2 p ( fig. 5 ) and the apparent circularity can be circumvented in the same way.
Definition 41 (Application of a partial motivation)
The application of the substitution σ to the environment Γ, whose result is an environment abbreviated by σ(Γ), is recursively defined as:
Definition 42 (Partial motivation of an environment) A substitution σ partially motivates the environment Γ ≡ x 1 :
Definition 43 (Partial motivation of a type) A substitution σ partially motivates a type C relatively to an environment Γ, abbreviated σ mot Γ C if (i) σ mot Γ and (ii) there is a term t such that σ(Γ) ⊢ 2p t : σ(C).
Depending on the context, σ mot Γ will denote the previous derivations, or the fact that the environment Γ can be partially motivated by σ. The same applies for the σ mot Γ C notation.
Example 44 σ := [x 2 → t 2 , x 4 → t 4 ] partially motivates the type C relatively to Γ := x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x 5 : A 5 if:
(ii) there is t such that
Remark 45
When dom(Γ) ⊆ dom(σ) we have the total motivation definition of λ 2 t . When dom(σ) = ∅ the behaviour of CC r is recovered.
For every environment Γ, [ ] mot Γ holds. However, for a type C, we of course do not always have [ ] mot Γ C. 
Results
In this section, we will identify the constants o and ⊤ of the previous systems λ Proof immediate by using an empty motivation whenever the (p-prod) rule is used (similar to the proof for CC r in [3, sec. 3.4] ) .
Proof immediate by structural induction on the derivation:
• the (t-ax) case is done in the previous lemma 46;
• for the (t-prod) case, applying the induction hypothesis on all the derivations of σ mot Γ ∀x A .B is enough to obtain σ mot Γ ∀x A .B and to conclude using (p-prod).
In order to prove the converse of the previous lemma, namely that λ 2 p is a subsystem of λ 2 t , we will need to complete partial motivation to make them total. Therefore there is a need to define the substitution resulting of the composition of two substitutions:
Definition 49 (Composition of substitutions) σ ⊙ ρ is the composition substitution of the two substitutions σ and ρ defined by:
where
Lemma 50 For every raw term t and substitutions σ and ρ we have σ⊙ρ(t) ≡ σ(ρ(t)).
Proof immediate by induction on the raw term t.
By the definition of σ mot Γ ∀x A .B, we have a term t such that σ(Γ) ⊢ 2p t : σ(∀x A .B) is a sub-derivation, and then by induction hypothesis σ(Γ) ⊢ 2t t : σ(∀x A .B). Hence there is a substitution ρ (lem. 39) such that
We then have ρ ⊙ σ mot Γ ∀x A .B since:
is a sub-derivation, and then by induction hypothesis σ(
Hence there is ρ ′ such that σ(Γ <i ) ⊢ • if y i ∈ dom(σ) then y i ∈ dom(σ(Γ)), and then from ( * ) using the Poincaré criterion (thm. 16 and prop. 3) 38, 50 ).
• finally from ( * ), transferring the motivation to the conclusion (lem. 22) we have ⊢
Thus the induction hypothesis applied to the first premise gives Γ, x : A ⊢ 2t B : Prop and the (t-prod) allows to conclude.
Theorem 52 (λ 2 p is a pedagogical sub-system of CC) λ 2 p satisfies the following properties:
(iii) x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n wf 2p if and only if x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n wf c and there are terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that
Proof (i) holds since λ 2 p is a sub-system of λ 2 (thm. 47) itself a sub-system of CC. For (ii) and (iii) it is enough to notice that λ 6 Pedagogical system F λ 2 p is a pedagogical subsystem of CC, syntactically equivalent to the systems λ 2 e and λ 2 t (lem. 38, 39, 48, 51) . In this section we link those systems with the second order pedagogical λ-calculus P-Prop 2 of [6] . First we recall the system P-Prop 2 , then we show that it is equivalent to λ 2 t .
System definition
Definition 53 (Types of P-Prop 2 ) Types of P-Prop 2 are built according to the following rules: (i) ⊤ is a type; (ii) types variables α, β, γ, . . . are types; (iii) if A and B are types then A→B is a type; (iv) if α is a type variable and A a type then ∀α.A is a type. The finite set of free variables of a type A, noted V(A), is defined in the usual way.
Definition 54 (Terms of P-Prop
2 ) Terms of P-Prop 2 are built according to the following rules: (i) o is a term; (ii) term variables x, y, z, . . . are terms; (iii) if x is a term variable, A a type and t a term then λx A .t is a term; (iv) if α is a type variable and t a term then Λα.t is a term; (v) if t and u are terms then t u is a term; (vi) if t is a term and U a type then t U is a term. Definition 55 (Substitutions of P-Prop 2 ) A substitution of P-Prop 2 is an application from type variables to types. The application of a substitution σ to a type A, defined in the usual way, is noted σ · A. A constant substitution but in a finite number of points α 1 , . . . , α n , associated respectively to the types
Definition 56 (Contexts of P-Prop
2 ) A context ∆ of P-Prop 2 is a finite set of couples x : A where x is a term variable and A a type. Moreover if x : A and x : B are into the set ∆ then A = B. The context {x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n } is abbreviated to x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n . The set of free variables of a context ∆ = x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , noted V(∆), is defined the usual way as the union of the V(A i ).
The following definitions of motivation refer to the formal system P-Prop 2 ( fig. 6 ):
Definition 57 (Motivations of P-Prop 2 ) A substitution σ of P-Prop 2 motivates a type A, noted ⊢ pf σ · A, if there is a term t such that ⊢ pf t : σ · A. By extension, a substitution σ motivate a context ∆ = x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , noted ⊢ pf σ · ∆, if for all i we have ⊢ pf σ · A i .
Remark 58 In P-Prop 2 , and unlike λ 2 t , substitutions and contexts are set based, terms and types are disjoint, and a motivated type is not necessarily closed. Also since types are not built into the system P-Prop 2 every rules introducing new types need to be constrained (see fig. 6 ).
Results
Definition 59 (Translation from P-Prop 2 to λ Proof by structural induction on the derivation: Lemma 63 (exchange in λ
Proof immediate (lem. 62) since λ Lemma 64 If Γ ⊢ 2t w : C then we can split Γ in two environments Γ 1 and Γ 2 such that: (i) Γ is a permutation of Γ 1 ,
Proof Let Γ ≡ x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n . Since we have x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x i : A i ⊢ 2t A i+1 : κ (prop. 4): either κ ≡ Type and then A i+1 ≡ Prop (lem. 37); or κ ≡ Prop and then A i+1 ≡ Prop (lem. 14, 39). We can then put all the x i : A i where A i ≡ Prop in front of the environment (lem. 63) to constitute the Γ 1 part, the others constituting the Γ 2 part.
Remark 65 The elements of Γ 1 can appear in any order (lem. 63). The same holds also for Γ 2 since the A i only depend on the variables x j : Prop of Γ 1 (prop. 8 and lem. 39).
In the following, we will assume that the Γ 1 part of Γ in judgements Γ wf 2t or Γ ⊢ 2t w : C is implicit and then we will omit mentioning it. It can be reconstituted by putting in it every free variables of Γ, w and C. This is allowed by the properties of strengthening (lem. 24) and weakening (lem. 18) permitting us to add and remove elements of type Prop into Γ.
Those observations allow for a simpler definition of the translation of contexts of P-Prop 2 to environments of λ The translation of a context of P-Prop 2 to an environment of λ 2 t is defined by:
Lemma 67 (type correctness of λ
Proof immediate: it already holds for λ Definition 69 (Universal trivial motivation) The universal trivial motivation τ is the constant substitution associating ⊤ to every type variable.
Proof in [6, thm. 19] .
Lemma 71 If ∆ ⊢ pf u : F then there is a derivation of ∆ ⊢ pf u : F using only the trivial motivation τ in the premise of the rules (P-Ax), (P-Hyp) and (P-∀ e ).
Proof by structural induction on the derivation. For each of the three rules, every motivated formulas appear as a sub-type of the conclusion sequent. Thus they are also motivable by τ (prop. 70). We can then replace everywhere the premise
Lemma 72 If ∆ ⊢ pf w : C is a derivation using only the trivial motivation τ , then
As for (P-Ax) and (P-Hyp), from ⊢ pf τ · V we deduce z : 
Lemma 73 If Γ ⊢ 2t w : C and w ≡ Prop then there is a term or a type w ′ of P-Prop
First the induction hypothesis gives us a term
is a sub-derivation, we are faced to two cases:
• if κ ≡ Type, then A ≡ Prop (lem. 37) and in this case w ′ := Λx.u ′ fits;
• if κ ≡ Prop, then A ≡ Prop, and we can apply the induction hypothesis to get a term
The induction hypothesis gives us a term
We have to consider two cases in the sub-derivation Γ ⊢ 2t A : κ:
• if κ ≡ Type, then A ≡ Prop (lem. 37) and in this case w ′ := ∀x.B ′ fits;
• if κ ≡ Prop, then A ≡ Prop and then x ∈ V(B) (prop. 8), and the induction hypothesis gives us a term
we can distinguish two cases:
• if κ ≡ Type, then D i+1 ≡ Prop (lem. 37);
• if κ ≡ Prop, then D i+1 ≡ Prop and the lemma 73 finishes the proof.
(ii) This is exactly the lemma 73.
(iii) We have three cases (lem. 67):
• C ≡ Type: then the implication is valid by vacuity;
• y 1 : D 1 , . . . , y n : D n ⊢ 2t C : Type: then C ≡ Prop (lem. 37);
• y 1 : D 1 , . . . , y n : D n ⊢ 2t C : Prop: then C ≡ Prop and the lemma 73 concludes.
Lemma 75
Prop then there is a substitution ρ such that ⊢ pf ρ · ∆ and ⊢ pf ρ · C;
With ρ the empty substitution, we have trivially ⊢ pf ρ · ∅.
(t-env2)
There are two cases: (t-ax)
By induction hypothesis on the premise we have a substitution ρ such that ⊢ pf ρ · ∆, we can then derive ∆ ⊢ pf o : ⊤ by (P-Ax), and then we have also ⊢ pf ρ · (∆, ⊤).
By induction hypothesis we have a substitution ρ such that ⊢ pf ρ · (∆, x : A, ∆ ′ ) and then by (P-Hyp) we get ∆, x : A, ∆ ′ ⊢ pf x : A.
(t-abs) Depending on the type of x, we are faced to one on those two cases:
Each case can be easily solved using the induction hypothesis on the first premise and the (→ i ) and (∀ i ) rules (respectively).
Definition 78 (Type inhabitation) For a given formal system, the type inhabitation problem is:
input: a context (or an environment) Γ, and a type A;
output: "true" if there is a term t such that Γ ⊢ ⋆ t : A, and "false" otherwise. Proof A (constructive) proof can be found in [5] about formal systems corresponding to the type systems Prop 2 and P-Prop 2 . The translation γ , inspired by the A-translation of [11] , consists in replacing every occurrences of type variables α by α ∨ γ where γ is a fresh type variable.
Property 80 Type inhabitation for Prop
2 is undecidable.
Proof by Urzyczyn in [36] .
Lemma 81 Type inhabitation for P-Prop 2 is undecidable.
Proof by contradiction. Assume that type inhabitation for P-Prop 2 can be decided by an algorithm D: D(∆, A) = true if and only if there is a term t such that ∆ ⊢ pf t : A. We can then build an algorithm D ′ able to decide the problem of type inhabitation for Prop
But we noticed that the type inhabitation for Prop 2 is undecidable (prop. 80).
Definition 82 (Type checking) For a given type system, the problem of type checking is:
input: a context (or an environment) Γ, a term t and a type A;
output: "true" if there is a derivation of Γ ⊢ ⋆ t : A, and "false" otherwise. {y 1 : B 1 , . . . , y n : B n }.
Proof
⇒ From ∆ ⊢ pf t : A we have ⊢ pf λ∆.t : ∆→A using (→ i ) and then ⊢ pf Λ α.λ∆.t : ∀ α.∆→A using (∀ i ). So t ′ := Λ α.λ∆.t fits.
⇐ Conversely from ⊢ pf t ′ : ∀ α.∆→A using (∀ e ) we have ⊢ pf t ′ α : ∆→A since the α are motivable ⊤, and then by weakening we have ∆ ⊢ pf t ′ α : ∆→A and finally using (→ e ) we obtain ∆ ⊢ pf t ′ α ∆ : A, namely t := t ′ α ∆ fits. Weakening for P-Prop 2 has been proved in [6, prop. 21] if the introduced formula can be motivated: here the formulas of ∆ are all motivable by the trivial substitution τ since they appear as sub-formulas in ∀ α.∆→A (prop. 70).
Theorem 85
The type checking problem for λ 2 t is undecidable.
Proof by contradiction. Let us assume that the type checking problem for λ But the type inhabitation problem for P-Prop 2 is undecidable (lem. 81).
Corollary 86
The type checking problem for λ 2 p is undecidable.
Proof is an immediate consequence of the equivalence of λ 
Definition 87 (Type checking with explicit motivations)
For a given type system with explicit motivations, the type checking problem for explicit motivations is the following:
input: a context (or environment) Γ, a substitution σ, a term t and a type A;
output: "true" if there is a derivation of Γ ⊢ ⋆ σ t : A, and "false" otherwise.
Theorem 88
The type checking problem for λ 2 e is undecidable.
Proof by contradiction. Let us assume that the type checking problem for λ • A ≡ Type and t ≡ Prop: D ′ (Γ, t, A) = false and Γ ⊢ 2t t : Type (lem. 15).
• A ≡ Prop and t ≡ Prop: D ′ (Γ, t, A) = false and Γ ⊢ 2t Prop : Prop (lem. 14)
• A ≡ Prop and t ≡ Prop: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have given an example of the formal definition of pedagogical subsystem of the Calculus of Constructions of [3] that we called λ 2 p , corresponding precisely to the pedagogical second-order λ-calculus of Colson and Michel [6] . Moreover the formalism of CC used in the definition allows for an homogeneous description of various type systems. For instance the introduced constraints for the second-order necessarily need to be transferred to higher orders pedagogical calculi; conversely once a pedagogical Calculus of Constructions will be obtained, pedagogical versions of the λ-cube systems should appear by deletion of some rules and simplification of associated constraints. Furthermore a pedagogical Calculus of Constructions can open the study toward pedagogical pure type systems [1] . Thus we believe the objective of giving a uniform formal handling of the study of formal pedagogy has been reached.
During the building of our system λ 2 p we uncovered a formalism making explicit into the judgements the needed motivations, λ 2 e . This kind of formalism seems to be natural for expressing pedagogical calculi. Also it allows to state more precise and intuitive meta-mathematical properties about these systems. However we have shown it does not carry enough useful information to consider an implementation, especially because the type-checking is still undecidable.
As a conclusion, we suggest a simple solution to this problem: let us annotate types with terms to ensure their motivability, just like the typed λ-calculus annotate pure λ-terms with types to ensure their normalization. As an example we give modified rules (env 2 ) and (prod) implementing this (term annotation is at the bottom of types): Γ σ ⊢A a : κ x ∈ dom(Γ) In such a formalism, terms should contain the needed information to allow the rebuild of the derivation and then type-checking.
